Mehmann  and Li – Ethical, Legal, Social, and Policy Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military

This week we look at the use of DNA technologies in an enthralling article by Maxwell J. Mehmann and Tracy Yeheng Li, ‘Ethical, Legal, Social, and Policy Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military’ (Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47, no. 1 (2015): 115–65.), available here.

Here’s what we thought. Let you know what you think in the comments below, or send us a message to join to network.


This long but incredibly interesting paper explores many of the bioethical issues associated with the use of genetic and genomic science by the US military. Such is the scope of the paper that there are almost too many points to discuss in a short blog, so for this reason I’d therefore like to focus on the question of genomic enhancement (pp. 161–164). While I am sure many people can agree that genomic enhancement has great potential to improve the effectiveness of warfighters, I wonder what the implications will be for soldiers once their term of service comes to an end? The author doesn’t address this question, and it remains for me perhaps the biggest ‘elephant in the room’ when we come to consider bio-technology and the military. While I agree there are certainly distinctions to be made between the civilian and military paradigms when it comes to ethics and responsibility, we should not forget that the two worlds are of course interlinked. What this means on a practical level is that any civilian can potentially become an enlisted member of the military, and of course any member of the military is always already a member of the civilian world as well.

My concern here is that by introducing bio-enhancements to the military (which we must assume will slowly filter through to the civilian world) we will in effect be creating a new category of the human, entrenching difference within human society. Indeed, we should ask, are these ‘enhanced’ soldiers even human at all? This question becomes even more significant when we consider the author’s claim that the most powerful enhancements may well need to be engineered at the embryonic stage, thus leading to the possibility that we will ‘lab grow’ our future soldiers. If they are lab grown and effectively enlisted from birth, what happens when their term of service ends? Does it ever end? Or will they rather be put down, like a dangerous dog, when they no longer demonstrate value for the military machine?

Mike Ryder, Lancaster University


This article was absolutely fascinating. However, it made me think of things far closer to home than the US military. For a while, I have been considering having my DNA sequenced as a shortcut to find out how I will react to different physical fitness training programmes (and in the vain hope that it will reveal I’ve got the genetic talent to be a world-beating talent at an obscure sport that I’ve never tried!). At least one of the companies offering this also look at corporate wellbeing, allowing employees to volunteer to have their DNA sequenced in order for their employer to be able to optimise their staff’s efficacy and work plans. What this article made me think of is why not use DNA sequencing to optimise military personnel? We know that all people have different skills and aptitudes, so why not inform commanders through genetics about which of their subordinates will be best for different tasks? Of course, this does not incorporate the impact that the environment has upon the individuals, so it is not foolproof. But, if DNA sequencing can help troops train and perform better, then it is surely beneficial to military effectiveness. However, it is currently expensive. Perhaps when prices drop it will be worth it for militaries to test all their personnel. At the very least it will be less problematic than enabling troops to use performance-enhancing drugs.

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University

Williamson – Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses

This week, we are looking at Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses by Richard L. Williamson (Chicago Journal of International Law 4, no. 1 (2003): 59–82), available here. It is a great overview of the different pros and cons that hard law, soft law and political norms have in the arena of arms control. Definitely worth reading. Let us know what you think in the comments below, or get in touch to join the network.

Here’s what we thought:


In this article the author provides a broad overview of legal vs non-legal approaches to addressing the question of arms control. In it, he argues that the ‘overall compliance record in arms control is a good one’ (61), but points to the fact that law is not always the best option to make the world a safer place. While law is an important factor, the author calls for a mixed approach adopting ‘a full complement of treaties, modified or supplemented over time to meet changing conditions, and supported with soft law and non-law measures’ (82).

The author’s analysis is certainly interesting, and a useful reference for those factors that make law more or less of an effective measure in the context of international arms control. However, while the author asserts that the overall compliance record in arms control is a good one, this is not to say that there aren’t further transgressions taking place that we don’t know about, given the fact that, by their very nature, States will attempt to avoid detection when it comes to breaking terms of any agreements or international laws that may apply.

The author’s arguments apply only because they apply to the world as we understand it (or rather understood it in 2003); but this is not to say that they won’t change in the future, or as our understanding of the present-day world changes. We must also then consider the role of non-State actors and even big business in the control of arms, and even the competing forces at works within individual nation States that again, serve to raise questions about the validity of the author’s arguments when made on such a broad, sweeping scale.

Mike Ryder, Lancaster  University


This piece was excellent and I really enjoyed it. Unfortunately for the purposes of comment, it was an overview of an area, rather than making an argument. Something that the author mentions in terms of verifying that states are complying with the relevant measures is the actions of foreign intelligence agencies. We have seen this recently where Israeli intelligence found evidence of Iran breaching its obligations under the nuclear deal they agree with the P5+1. This did make me wonder if, in circumstances where an arms control measure has no verification body, are revelations made possible due to the behaviours of intelligence agents part of a bigger political game? For example, if the American CIA found evidence of Russia cheating on its arms control obligations, the obvious next action would be to expose them in order to force compliance with their obligations. However, it would also be rational for the Americans to sit on this intelligence if a larger win could be gained. For example, Russia could be blackmailed, the timing of the intelligence release could be done at a crucial moment for Russia in international politics, or it could be released to move focus away from American arms control compliance.

As we know, international law cannot be separated from international politics. But, perhaps in thinking only in legal logic, we international law thinkers miss key bits of information that could inform a greater level of understanding.

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University


N.B. For those interested, the main image is of Ford and Brezhnev signing a joint communique folowing the Vladivostok Summit Meeting on Arms Control (Photo from the Gerald R. Ford Library, taken by David Hume Kennerly 1974).

Beard – The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes

This week we continue our look at arms control. Here we consider the article ‘The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention‘ by Jack M. Beard (The American Journal of International Law 101, no. 2 (April 2007): 271–321, avaialble here). It is a fascinating look at the Biological Weapons Convention using game theory and rationalist positions on arms control, and gives an intriguing insight into how states operate in this area.

Take a look and let us know your think about the issues. Here’s what we thought:


In this article the author argues that the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 is fundamentally flawed in a modern context as it is based on a ‘soft law’ approach that relies too heavily on indeterminacy of meaning. To demonstrate this failing, the author cites the suggestion that rogue States and terrorists possess biological weapons, and points to the fact that a significant number of States have still not joined the convention after all these year years. In response, the author calls for the United States to re-evaluate its position on the BWC and for all parties to embrace a new hard-law approach.

While I certainly agree with the premise of the author’s argument, I can’t help but wonder what impact the BWC could possibly have in a world where (by the author’s own admission) non-State actors have access to these types of weapons, that pose perhaps one of the biggest threats to our modern-day world. While the author is right to draw attention to the BWC’s failings in a modern context, the author steers away from dealing with economic, regulatory and trade-related factors that give non-State actors access to the sorts of tools and equipment that enables the production and/or trade in biological and chemical weapons.

Mike Ryder, Lancaster  University


I thought this paper was really interesting. I myself have done some work around game theory and international legal regulation of weapon systems controlled by artificial intelligence. I find game theory to be really useful for understanding arms control. After all, states do try to play games and defect from agreements when it is in their interests.

We see today the potential falling apart of the Iran Deal. The article notes Iran reneging on agreements from previous deals. This obviously raises the issue that if Iran is a nation that plays international games, what is the point in having any deal? Simply put, some regulation is better than nothing. This reminds me of the work of Marxist historian E.P. Thompson on the rule of law. He suggests that the rule of law is an ‘unqualified human good’ because even in stares that oppressive states that often act unlawfully, they must give the appearance of acting lawfully. In doing so, this limits their very worst behaviours. So even where the rule of law is almost ignored, it still does something positive however small an impact that may be.

I think this can apply to arms control regimes also. Even where Iran (or any other defector nation) plays games, tries to get around arms control rules, or breaks rules, they do so whilst giving the illusion that they comply with the arms control regimes. These regimes therefore act to hamper and impair acts contrary to the rules, however small that impact may be. Arguably, we could therefore view arms control as an unqualified human good in much the same way that Thompson viewed the rule of law.

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University


Let us know what you think below.

Fuhrmann and Lupu – Do Arms Control Treaties Work?: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

This week begins a series of discussions on arms control. Whilst we’ve looked at this topic before, this series (and the next two) are all the suggestions of TTAC21 member Maaike Verbruggen. We thank her for the great spread of interesting articles she has found and submitted to the rest fo the group. 

The paper this week is ‘Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’ by Matthew Fuhrmann and Yonatan Lupu (International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2016): 530–39; available here). 

Without further ado, here is what we think. Please let us know your thoughts in the comment below. 


In this paper the authors outline research that addresses the question of whether the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has limited the spread of nuclear weapons. While the authors point to the range of debates on this subject, with significant studies falling on both sides of the fence, the authors’ study demonstrates that the NPT has had a significant impact on reducing the probability that States will pursue or acquire nuclear weapons.  

While this study is of course interesting in its own, one of the other useful contributions it makes is its role in demonstrating that international treaties can indeed make a significant impact on the global landscape. As the authors argue: ‘Policymakers therefore should not be overly dismissive of treaties as a tool for meeting key challenges in the 21st century’ (23). However, while I find the conclusions of the study encouraging, I would still question the wider context surrounding the NPT itself, as the NPT does not exist in isolation, and sits within the context of many decades of Cold War anxiety that has left an indelible mark on the hearts and minds of many people, which may then have fed into the likelihood of State actors ratifying and then adhering to the strictures of the NPT. Can we ever say for certain that the NPT is the defining causal factor behind the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons? I’d argue perhaps not. 

Mike Ryder, Lancaster  University 

 


The main thrust of this article is to show that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) works. I would have expected it to for those states who are signatories. Seeing as states cannot be bound by rules they do not consent to in international law, it makes sense that only states who agree with the NPT rules would sign up to abide by them. Considering that nuclear proliferation is in nobody’s interest, this also makes sense from a security perspective. However, North Korea are notable state parties who have left the treaty. We see currently the US, South Korean, and international attempts to get North Korea to dismantle its nuclear warfare capability. Considering this is outside of the NPT, it would seem that the attempted de-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is taking place using pure diplomacy (including altering sanctions). If concerted diplomatic efforts (and possibly even military action) is needed to keep states with WMD ambitions in check, then the NPT alone is not enough. Preventing the spread of WMDs is something which all states have an interest in, and the NPT should be recognised as a part of the solution, as this article claims. 

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University 

In relation to autonomous weapon systems, how much human control is ‘meaningful’? 

This week we consider what level of human control over killer robots is meaningful. This has been a topic of great discussion at the UN as part of the deliberations about whether or not these systems should be banned. Indeed, Paul Scharre has just written an interesting blog on this very subject, see here. 

 

Here’s what we think: 

 

It’s great that this question should come up on TTAC21 as it’s something I’m particularly interested in at the moment. From my position, human control isn’t really very ‘meaningful’ and hasn’t been for a long time. If anything drone pilots don’t so much represent a lack of control so much as highlighting for us the lack of control, or lack of human agency, that’s been present in the military for a very long time. I mean even go so far back as the Second World War and already technology was starting to take over many of the duties of actually ‘waging war’. Skip on a few years and you get to the nuclear bomb, wherein one single individual ‘presses the button’, though in reality the decision to use the bomb was made many years before and by a great many people. At what point is the single decision to press the red button meaningful? I argue not at all, if the weapon exists alongside the common will to use it. If not pilot A pressing the button, then the military can simply send pilot B or pilot C. And while we’re at it, we better make sure it lands where we tell it to. Better get a machine to do the job… 

 

Mike Ryder, Lancaster University 

 

This question really is an important one. Despite studying international law, perhaps it is more important than the legal questions over AWS. I think the approach which Paul Scharre suggests, that if we had a technologically perfect autonomous weapon system what role would we still want humans to play is a great one. I think it is the question which will lead the international community towards whatever answer they come to in relation to meaningful human control. 

For me, I’m coming to the conclusion that unless an instance of combat is of a high intensity and military personnel from your own side or civilians are going to die without immediate action and the speed of decision-making that only an AWS will have, then it would always be preferable to have a human overseeing lethal decisions, if not actually making them. Whilst the legal arguments can be made convincingly for both no automation and full automation of lethal decision-making, I cautiously argue that where technology has the required capabilities then lethal decision-making by an AWS could be lawful. Ethically however, I would prefer a higher standard which would include humans in the decision-making process. But, ethically desirable is more than ‘meaningful’ and this is why I think Scharre has gotten the jump on the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots; reaching a ‘meaningful’ level of human involvement is a minimum threshold, but ethically desirable can go as high as anybody wants. Of course, this then makes it harder to discuss and so may tied up the CCW discussions for longer – although I hope it will be worth it. 

For me, ‘meaningful’ comes down to a human deciding that characteristics XYZ make an individual worthy of targeting. In an international armed conflict, that might be them wearing the uniform of an adversary. In a non-international armed conflict, it may be that they have acted in such a way to make them an adversary (I.e. directly participating in hostilities). But, that human decision can still be pre-determined and later executed by a machine. The temporal and physical distance does not alter the decision that XYZ characteristics mean that the potential target becomes a definitive target. Others will disagree with my conception of ‘meaningful’, and I hope it will generate discussion, but this is also why I favour Scharre’s method of moving forward. 

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University 

Krieg and Rickli – Surrogate warfare: the art of war in the 21st century?

This week we are looking at the topic of Surrogate Warfare in an article by Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli. The article is available here. The piece covers ideas of surrogacy in warfare thorugh all sorts of interesting means, from mercenaries and militias to drones and satellites. We hope you enjoy the article. Let us know what you think in the comments. 

 


In this article, the authors note the modern tendency towards ‘surrogate warfare’, in which States externalise the burden of war in order to distance themselves from the violence exercised by their surrogates (5). While the authors argue that surrogate warfare is ‘probably not the panacea for fighting wars in the twenty-first century’ (15), they do concede that surrogate warfare is going to become more common as risks and conflicts are not likely to recede any time soon (15). 

I found this article interesting, though somewhat lacking in analysis, and I was left wondering how much of it is really ‘new’. Furthermore, I struggle to find the actual argument put forward by the authors who focus primarily on explaining what surrogate warfare is, and why it’s so prevalent. They don’t propose any solutions, nor even any remedies or genuine responses – or even make a sufficiently strong case as to why surrogate warfare might be a bad thing. Surrogate warfare may not be the panacea, but then the world is a very different place to it was in the time of Carl von Clausewitz. 

Mike Ryder, Lancaster University 

 


I thought this article was a little misplaced, in that whilst it was really interesting it did not seem to fit well as an academic journal article. As it gives a very thorough overview of states using surrogates in their acts of war, it seemed that this would be a better fit for a textbook chapter. I struggled to find anything that felt truly ‘new’ in this article, it felt as though a history lesson on state use of mercenaries and militias was being put together with some thoughts on modern warfare technologies and PMC’s and given a gloss of conceptual paint under the term ‘surrogate warfare’. I’m sure this would be really interesting to scholars of security and war studies who want a new perspective spin linking current conceptions of PMC’s to historical views of mercenaries, but it didn’t really chime with me in any way. That said, if I were teaching on mercenaries and PMC’s, I would definitely recommend this to my students as a primer document full of great information. 

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University 

Morgan – The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today

This week we are considering ‘The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today’ by Patrick M. Morgan (2012, Contemporary Security Policy, 33:1, 85-107). It considers how deterrence and deterrence theory has changed since the cold war, and how it could be revived in some ways to deter future conflicts.

Here’s what we thought:


In this long and detailed article published in 2012, the author asks ‘What does deterrence, in theory and practice, look like now?’ As there is just so much content in this article, I thought I’d highlight one particular passage that interests me. In it, the author suggests:

‘there is an alliance among democracies, whether explicit or not, involving a semi-automatic extended deterrence. Numerous adjustments in thinking about security are required to encompass the complications this entails.’ (94)

Naturally, there are several issues with ‘Collective Actor Deterrence’, and the author does explore them. But I wonder, what does everyone think about this notion? Does the concept hold water in 2018? Especially given there seems to be a political reluctance to sufficiently enforce sanctions and threats, leading to a credibility gap between what international State actors say, and what they do.

Mike Ryder, Lancaster University


The article reviews the state of deterrence anno 2012, in both the academic and policy world, and discusses to what extent it has changed since the Cold War. The fact it was written in 2012 must be kept in mind, as the article is a little bit dated. The security environment has changed substantially to a more “traditional” and state-oriented environment since 2012. I would be curious to see an updated version of the article, and what these developments meant for the author’s conceptualisation of deterrence. I appreciate how the author views the subject of deterrence not merely through realist glasses, as most of the literature does. This allowed for a broad conceptualisation of deterrence and its influences. For instance, his inclusion of non-realist determinants of the ‘national interest’ was a welcome contribution to the literature on deterrence.

I would have appreciated it if the article was a bit more systematic though. Perhaps the article was too short (as it seems like it was an attempt to condense the author’s 2009 book on deterrence in an article), but I missed a sharp definition of what deterrence was; a systematic method to analyse historical changes; and structurally distinguishing between academic research, foreign policy; and the meta-level analysis beyond both policy and academic work on deterrence. Instead the article a non-structured narrative, that makes the analysis seem ad hoc, mentioning different characteristics of the contemporary security environment but staying at such a surface level that nothing really new or meaningful is said.

Because of the non-systematic analysis, the concept of deterrence gets stretched significantly. While I understand that the point of the author is to explain how the nature of deterrence has changed, I feel that if you want to call military intervention to halt human rights violations deterrence, you really need to justify your choices about what deterrence is, why you choose that definition, and why certain behaviour falls under deterrence. Otherwise you risk that the concept of deterrence becomes meaningless. Furthermore, if the point is to describe how

deterrence has developed over time and how the concept has now expanded, the article needs a more in-depth consideration of the historical nature of non-nuclear forms of deterrence, non-superpower deterrence and pre-Cold War deterrence policies. Are the contemporary forms of deterrence truly unique now, or have they always been here, and was the Anglo-Saxon IR literature perhaps preoccupied with nuclear weapons and superpowers with little eye for other forms of deterrence?

The literature on deterrence is so interesting to me, both due to the subject of deterrence, but also on a meta-level, as the academic literature has played such a pivotal role on foreign policy (e.g. Thomas Schelling), and the political views of the authors (from various camps) shine through in their analysis. The author did not really touch the academic and policy interplay significantly, nor debated where the changing attitudes about deterrence come from. This is a shame, especially as deterrence is all about perception, belief, and conventional narratives. It is about convincing an adversary that you are willing them to strike in such a way that it would be foolish for the adversary to attack. But it follows a certain logic, and if an adversary does not believe in that logic, it makes your policy less powerful. So what makes actors believe in that logic or not? What made this paradigm fall out of fashion? And what has changed that that logic is no longer as prevalent, neither in academia nor in policy (anno 2012)? I would have loved to see such meta-level reflections from the author in this paper. Now only how has deterrence changed, but a bit more critical reflection on why it has changed, besides changes in the security environment. However, it is possible that the author expands more on this in their book.

Maaike Verbruggen,Vrije Universiteit Brussel


What does deterrence look like today in both theory and practice? This is the fundamental question Morgan sets out to address throughout the course of this paper. The author draws some useful parallels between pre- and post-Cold War deterrence thinking whilst also highlighting key divergences. Morgan underlines contextual shifts that are shaping contemporary deterrence such as expanding normative constraints on the use of force, the shifting nature of threats and continuous technological change. But contrary to common assertions that such contextual shifts render deterrence inadequate for addressing contemporary security challenges, Morgan sees this as a flawed outlook and moves to highlight that deterrence, rather than becoming inadequate, has become more complex but remains relevant. An important point made here is that deterrence in international politics must be adjusted to accommodate major shifts in the regional and global international systems – but doing so is fraught with challenges. As Morgan puts it: “We are reshaping an important recourse for maintaining international order even as that order is itself being refashioned; we are altering our tools while we build on the run” (p. 86). For me, this echoes the type of dilemmas we are seeing across the board in relation to defence and security issues; where this element of not being able to keep up with the pace of change somewhat cripples our abilities to make meaningful progress in tackling certain challenges.

An interesting point Morgan touches on in this regard is the ability for opponents to design around traditional modes of deterrence (p. 86). The idea of designing around deterrence in order to eschew it seems particularly relevant to today’s security environment as we see

rapidly evolving threats, blurred thresholds of tolerance and hostile grey zone activity by increasingly assertive state actors. Whilst these issues do indeed make deterrence more complex, they also highlight again the vulnerabilities and potential inadequacies of current approaches to deterrence. The rapidity of technological innovation in unison with the types of challenges necessitates fresh thinking on deterrence to bridge vulnerability gaps and mitigate the ability for actors to ‘design around’ deterrence strategies. Deciding what, when and how to deter is constantly becoming more complex as new challenges – often underpinned by technological innovation – emerge. In this sense, it seems as though deterrence thinking/strategies themselves must also become more multifaceted, adaptive and innovative – even hybrid (not dissimilar traits to the threats it seeks to deter) in order to be credible in today’s security environment. I think this is an enormous challenge, not only in terms of understanding, recognising and deciding which of the multidimensional threats we face today would be responsive to deterrence, but also in terms of confronting the remaining inertia surrounding Cold War deterrence thinking in order to move firmly away from a ‘one size fits all’ approach.

Anna Dyson, Lancaster University


I liked Morgan’s paper, and thought it really interesting. I have been thinking about deterrence from an international law perspective for a little while. We usually think of the international law rules on the use of force as being a deterrent as no state really wants to be seen breaking them and be labelled an aggressor. But, we’ve seen a lot of breaches of those rules since 1945, without much damage to any state aggressors. So, perhaps public international law doesn’t have a strong deterrent facet.

However, as a large number of recent conflicts have involved non-state actors, and their wrongful acts are usually dealt with under international criminal law (ICL), I have been wondering whether ICL could have a deterrent effect not in the same terms we see domestic criminal law hopefully deterring criminality, but more in terms of deterring large-scale violence and insurgency. If ICL can deter this, it can essentially deter violent conflicts with non-state actors. Although the threat of prison can deter criminals, violent non-state actors are willing to die for their cause, and so the threat of prison may not impact them quite so much. Hopefully, I’ll get round to carrying out this research.

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University.

 


Let us know what you think in the comments below.

Lee – Will Trump’s Military Option against North Korea Work? Legal and Political Restraints

This week we are considering the military plan that Trump began formulating in case of a war with North Korea. The immediate threat appears to have subsided following on from an unprecedented charm offensive by the North Koreans at the Winter Olympics. Still, it could all get a bit scary again quite quickly with such unpredictable leaders as Trump and Kim.

The piece we are considering is: ‘Will Trump’s Military Option against North Korea Work? Legal and Political Restraints‘ by Eric Yong Joong Lee from the Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol.10(2).

Here’s what we thought, let us know your ideas in the comments box below.


Much as the title suggests, this paper explores the tense relationship between the U.S. and North Korea, in particular the extreme rhetoric traded between the two nation’s leaders, Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. The author then considers whether a military option is possible or even likely given the recent spate of nuclear tests and the increasingly threatening stance adopted by the North Korean leadership.

Here, the author suggests that the risks to U.S. citizens (in South Korea) and the expected losses such that it would be inadvisable for the U.S. to consider military action – especially given that the action would likely lead to stalemate. There is also then every chance that China might also get involved, leading to a political and military disaster.

As an article, I found this piece fairly interesting, and certainly very current, though I am not sure at just how credible it is in terms of its military analysis. I would certainly be interested to read further papers on the ‘what if…’ scenario of whether the U.S. really could defeat North Korea in an armed conflict, and what the possible consequences might be on the international stage. However having said that, I am encouraged by the recent diplomacy between the North and South, and hope very much that a peaceful resolution might one day be found.

Mike Ryder, Lancaster University


I feel like I am missing something important in this article. The author is an accomplished professor in international law specialising in the Korean Peninsula, who has written a lot of intelligent articles. This article however reads like a background article in a newspaper or magazine. It lacks specificity, depth, and is riddled with strong statements without any back-up.

In my eyes, assessing whether the USA going to war with the DPRK would be legal, necessitates describing the specific political relation at that time, the type of attack by the USA, and the actions of the DPRK leading to this attack. International law requires context. Without details about the political and military context, the article is not much more than an introduction to jus ad bellum, barely touching the specific considerations for going to war with the DPRK.

Statements about how different political actors would act are not backed up with arguments, even though the author makes many claims that are merely assumptions, or subject of heavy dispute. “These initial air bombings, however, will necessarily lead to Chinese intervention as shown in 1950.” Because China intervened in 1950 does not mean it will intervene following initial air bombings, that depends on the circumstances. “Finally, any armed attack against North Korea would lead Seoul and Tokyo to decouple from Washington because, in case of war, their military alliances are loosening to escape the most disastrous outcome from North Korea’s nuclear attack.” Any attack will automatically lead to decoupling? That depends on what is the last straw that pushed the US to go to war, whether it is a joint decision with ROK, the state of missile defence of both countries, etc. Would ROK really decouple from the USA AFTER the USA has already gone to war to the DPRK? I would seriously doubt that, as ROK would then already be seriously threatened. But my opinion is irrelevant. The point is that bold claims require explanations. Other sentences raised my eyebrows as well, such as the claim that Camp David ended the unity of the Arab states against Israel, how vital the UK is for the US decision on going to war, or that it was the Iraq War that gave USA a bad international reputation as not respecting international law. All these claims can be made but they really need to be backed up by arguments, which this article does not.

Also, I honestly do not understand what point is the author trying to make with the NP. Is the author claiming that NPT forbids pre-emptive attacks against NWS as a form of deterrence? Or that deterrence policies lead to proliferation, as the DPRK wants to deter a strike from the USA? Or that the DPRK having nuclear weapons threatens the NPT? It might be just me but I really don’t get it.

Finally, there is a lot that I am missing. Where are the strategic-military considerations? The author focuses on political and legal considerations, but the type of operation and the capabilities of the DPRK (e.g. can it hit major US cities with its missiles) are huge factors. Where are the different domestic actors in the USA that might oppose and favour a strike and what role do they play in the decision-making process? How does foreign policy of the ROK factor in? Without specificity, depth and arguments to back up statements, this article explains very little and is not much aid for assessing the situation on the Korean peninsula.

 

Maaike Verbruggen, Vrije Universiteit Brussel


I found this essay useful in terms of it presenting a systematic view of the legal and political restraints that would hinder/limit Trump’s possible military option against North Korea. The author also presents some hypothetical insights into how military action might unfold, the associated responses from neighbouring parties and considerations that must be taken into account in relation to U.S. allies. By thinking through the many and varied legal and political restraints of a military attack, a complex view of the impracticality of such action against North Korea is strongly conveyed. While it is necessary to think about these possibilities, their ramifications and associated challenges – something the piece does well – I think it is equally important to contemplate some of the deeper questions underpinning the issue at hand in order to understand how this state of affairs came to be and how it can be avoided in the future. We are at a point in time where concerns over nuclear war are once again very real. Where symbolic measures of our own doom are being moved that bit closer to midnight against the backdrop of twitter insults and wars of words. And where essays such as this – detailing whether or not a military attack on North Korea would work – are necessary. For me, the role of rhetoric, particularly in the social media age, is one interesting aspect to consider here. The author outlines the inflammatory exchanges between Trump and Jong Un in chapter 2 and it raised interesting thoughts for me about the power and influence of rhetoric and its fundamental contribution to this current moment. Trump has singlehandedly been an advantageous propaganda machine for North Korea in many regards. Each tweet, threat and insult simply reinforcing what North Korea has long wished for – to be taken seriously as a credible nuclear armed state. Where does the power lie within this complex relationship when the words of a U.S. President are perhaps (inadvertently) bolstering a rogue state’s own sense of prestige and influence? And how might this affect or shape other potentially hostile state actors in pursuit of nuclear capabilities? I think that rather than simply reiterating that military action is not a viable option and that resuming diplomatic talks are the way forward, we must also be actively exploring the elements of this story that have been so detrimental and begin talking about how this can be learnt from and acted upon in order to better handle such challenges going forward.

Anna Dyson, Lancaster University


I liked Lee’s piece and his suggestion that the US and North Korea should talk as a way of de-escalating tensions. Indeed, that seems to be what has happened, although in a more convoluted way involving South Korea, Sweden, and the Winter Olympics. It seems that almost all conflicts end up with leaders round tables discussing the end-game. It is good that, at least it appears so for the time being, this process has been truncated. Although a focus on all-out nuclear war is obviously, and rightly, the highest of concern for many people. Now that this appears to have been averted, at least temporarily, I wonder whether the potential for cyber-conflict will re-emerge. Considering that North Korea was responsible for the WannaCry cyber-attack, I wonder if talks between the US and North Korea will include this topic? We can only wait and see.

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University


 

Sari – Blurred Lines: Hybrid Threats and the Politics of International Law

This week marks the start of a reduction in output for TTAC21. After about a year of work from all of us, it has become apparent that the 4 or 5 pieces each month that we were reviewing can take up a bit more time that would be ideal. So, we are switching down to 2 or 3. If you have previously been put off joining the network by the number of readings, but are now interested just send us an email. All are welcome.

Now, onto our reviews. We are again looking at hybrid warfare, or hybrid threat. Following on from the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, and some other questionable deaths of Russia ex-pats, in the UK the hybrid threat issue has remerged after a flurry of interest during the Crimean crisis of 2014. Prior to this recent increase in interest, Aurel Sari wrote ‘Blurred Lines: Hybrid Threats and the Politics of International Law‘. It is a consideration of how international law can be used as a counter to hybrid warfare, and hybrid threats, and how it should go about being used.

Here’s what we thought. If you’ve got anything you would like to say about it, just pop it in the comments box below.


The 2018 paper, ‘Blurred Lines: Hybrid Threats and the Politics of International Law’, recognises an important need to re-engage with the politics of international law to prevail in, what Sari describes as, ‘the current strategic environment’.  Sari argues that such an environment exists as a result of the blurred lines between what is legally described as war and peace. These blurred lines are being used in the manipulation of legal concepts and thresholds in order to disguise violations of international law.  Although this article recognises a valid problem in international law, I have grave concerns with the proposed solution to this problem; ‘Western nations and institutions’ are called upon to save the international legal order against, what Sari repeatedly refers to as, the ‘adversaries and competitors’.

The reader is reminded of Russia’s 2014 ‘brazen violation of international law’ in its intervention in Crimea. There is also mention of the maritime activities of China that do not coincide with the West’s concept of international order. Other than Russia and China, it is not clear exactly who else comes under the classification of ‘adversaries and competitors’. Do all non-Western nations and institutions come within this classification? Surely not, as the inherent problems of such an ethnocentric view are obvious.

It is also not clear how Sari has come to the conclusion that it is only the ‘Western nations and institutions’ that can act as the saviours of the international order. Whilst reading this article, I felt an unease with the running theme of colonial-era thinking that only the West matters. The article makes the assumption that it is the West that are the only ones who are qualified ‘to promote their vision of international order’ (emphasis added). However, Western nations and institutions are not immune from exploiting international law or acquiescing in such exploitations. We only have to look at the US-led operation in Syria against Daesh and the invocation of the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine by various states to see how international laws can be strategically manipulated for a states’ advantage.

Positioning the West against the rest of the world under, what looks a lot like, an ‘us v. them’ paradigm, is not the solution to the ‘current strategic environment’. The international order is an order that governs all states. If we are to take measures to prevent the abuse of international law, then we need all states to be involved in this process – not just the states and institutions from the West.

Jasmin Nessa, University of Liverpool


In this article, Aurel Sari examines increasing ‘instrumentalisation’ of law to achieve political ends, citing examples such as the Russian ‘intervention’ in Crimea. In response to the instrumentalisation of law, the author calls for concrete measures in three distinct areas: legal preparedness, legal resilience and deterrence, and legal defence. While the author focusses primarily on legal approaches to political problems, he unfortunately lacks political insights into what is a difficult and complex challenge. The biggest weakness here is that the author fails to suggest any meaningful solution to the question of international relations between States that often lack the political and/or military desire to act on threats of action against those States that act unlawfully.

Mike Ryder, Lancaster University


I really enjoyed this article, and think the problem of the blurred lines of hybrid threats and the politics of international law are extremely important subjects, and serious threats to present-day international institutions. I especially appreciated the solution-oriented thinking, although I wish the author expanded a bit more on how to achieve the proposed solutions, as those are not easy endeavours. I agree with what the author said, so I will not spend too much time criticising their opinion. Instead, I will focus on the big glaring omission of the article: Western blurred lines.

The article overwhelmingly discusses threats to international law by adversaries to the West, and how the West should respond to uphold international law. Kosovo and Iraq are mentioned somewhere in a sub-clause, but Western actions are otherwise barely considered. This is problematic, as Western countries have always also promoted a certain flavour of international law that is in their own interests, and have violated international law when it suited them. Consider many arms control treaties, devised in a way so the West does not lose its military advantageous position; the questionable status of nuclear sharing under the NPT; the lack of respect for international law when going to war in Iraq; or the fact that Israel is the lawfare pioneer par excellence. When will we see accountability for torture in Guantanamo or political follow-up on the Chilcott report? It reminded me of a recent interview where NYT journalist Jim Rutenberg claimed that Russian interference in US elections was bad, but US interference in other regimes is very different, as it is for the greater good. The cognitive dissonance is striking.

It is completely right to question the practices of Russia in Crimea, or Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria. I whole-heartedly agree that they are serious threats to international institutions as a whole. But one should not be blind for the actions of the West, and pretend there is no politics behind which countries and practices they consider problematic and which they do not. Western countries violate or (ab)use international law too, which is also a threat. I promise you that many countries in the Global South certainly do not see the West as firm protectors of international law. Furthermore, the selective outrage against Russia, China or Syria, but not against the USA or Israel, weakens the credibility of Western accusations. This janus-face risks that valid accusations about horrendous acts of chemical warfare in Syria are perceived as just another political stick to hit Russia with. This perception is extremely dangerous, as it leads to disillusionment and makes it significantly harder to restore respect for international law, which is urgently needed.

Dr Aurel Sari mentions three countermeasures against the threats to international law: strengthening legal preparedness, legal resilience and deterrence, and the capability for legal defence. I would thus add a fourth: More self-reflection and accountability for one’s own actions, and lead by example.

Against this proposal I can already hear the criticism: You are so naive. You are hypocritical, only criticising the West ignoring Russia and China. The West is so much better, and Western self-critique harms our global position Against that I have the following to say: (1) I agree with the basic premises of the article, but the omission of Western actions really weakens the argument, so that is what I comment on. It inaccurately represents reality. (2) It is rather concerning that in the current political climate the debate has become so polarised and black-and-white that questioning the established narrative leads to accusations of Russia-apologia. Disapproval of Western actions are not the same as approval of Russian actions. Russia is an authoritarian regime that violates international law and human rights. This does not mean they are an evil mastermind plotting the breakdown of the Western order and international institutions as a whole. The debate on information warfare has become completely hysterical, and seriously lacks self-reflection and taking responsibility. It is easier to pretend that Russia rigged your various elections and referenda than to admit how xenophobic or racist your population is, or that there might be a reason why your population is so disillusioned with its government. (3) I honestly believe it will strengthen Western arguments against violations of international law if they were known to be more accountable and self-reflexive themselves. It would strengthen international norms, increase credibility and remove ammunition against them, so this advice would thus actually be beneficial to them. (4) My advice is also not limited to Western countries. I wish all countries were more self-reflexive and

accountable. That said (5), I am Western, writing for a Western audience, from a democratic country with freedom of the press. I can affect Western policy a lot easier than I can affect Syrian policy. I think it is a natural phenomenon to be the most critical of one’s own country or community. I know it the best, and care about it. Misdoings bother me especially because I think we can do better, and because I want my community to uphold my personal values.

Maaike Verbruggen, Vrije Universiteit Brussel  


This article aims to highlight the growing necessity for the West to re-engage with the politics of international law in the face of adversarial subversive activities that breach, challenge and threaten the integrity of legal systems. The author discusses the “instrumentalisation” of law: the use of law by adversaries and competitors as a tool to augment diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence activities. What I found most interesting in this piece was that in order to confront these challenges of instrumentalisation, the author goes on to outline steps that themselves somewhat resonate with this notion of instrumentalising law; albeit in a less subversive fashion. It is suggested that Western states must put in place “…processes and capabilities to deny adversaries the benefits of using law as an asymmetric lever of influence.” (p. 6). Whilst mitigating Western legal vulnerabilities is, of course, essential – looking at this a little differently, does not creating and placing such processes and capabilities of denial (if underpinned by legal frameworks) amount to using law as an asymmetric lever of influence too, just in a different way?

There seems to be an underlying paradox associated with responding to/challenging adversarial breaches that is quite interesting to explore. It comes back to the idea of ‘lawfare’ – using/misusing law as a means to achieve an operational objective, but for me it also hints at a subtle overlap between the use and misuse of legal systems through the act of manipulation. Whether that is the manipulation of legal thresholds by hostile actors or the manipulation of legal systems and frameworks to mitigate these new threats through creating processes/capabilities of denial. This article consequently raised interesting thoughts for me about law and legal systems as simply extensions of the battlefield. Sari sums this up well when suggesting that Western states should acknowledge that “…law is a domain of competition, just like the land, maritime, air, information and cyber domains…”(p. 5); highlighting that law can be weaponised, manipulated and harnessed as an instrument to serve strategic advantages just as other domains more traditionally associated with war can. The lingering thought this paper left me with is: in order to prevent the erosion of legal integrity, how do Western states go about utilising law in such a way as to not inadvertently mirror the “instrumentalisation” of the law that we seek to confront?

Anna Dyson, Lancaster University.


I thought this piece brought a few interesting points together. Of course, as it is a policy paper, it is not very long and suffers a lack of detail as a result. But, it still gets the points across. I like Sari’s ideas of strengthening legal preparedness, resilience and deterrence, and capability for legal defence. But, all of this does beg the question whether Western nations defending a Western-dominated international order is because they want to retain the powerbase of international law, or because they want to defend something that usually works for most nations from other nations that want to subvert the global legal order for their own ends? There are also issues of whether Russia, China and other powers are trying to change the international legal order for their own ends, or to make it a more diverse and multi-polar system that represents and works for all people equally well, in the face of a Western-dominated history? I’m not really sure if international law has the tools to deal with this question, most of the international lawyers I know consider the extent of different perspectives that are worthwhile pursuing to be positivism v. natural law. Yet, if we turn to international relations theory, it turns into a classic realist v. liberalist debate. I guess this is a situation whereby there are no clear answers. Yet, it does seem that from a Western perspective, Russ and China are playing to win when it comes to International law.

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University


Let us know what you think!

Shaw – Robot Wars: US Empire and Geopolitics in the Robotic Age

Here’s our second article under discussion this month, Robot Wars: US Empire and Geopolitics in the Robotic Age by Ian Shaw. This work follows on from his great book Predator Empire, which is not only a well argued piece on the technology-based containment of the globe by the US, but also includes magnificent accounts of the history of target killing amongst other things.

 

 Here’s what we thought of his article: 


This reading group has been going for almost nine months now, and in that time it’s fair to say we’ve read a fair bit on drone warfare and autonomous weapons. From all of our reading thus far, I’m not sure that this article actually says anything specifically new about the field, or indeed offers any sort of radical insight. As is typical for a piece grounded (forgive the pun) in the Geographical and Earth Sciences, the paper is awash with ‘topographies’ and ‘spaces’, and yet all of this when drone warfare has been around for quite some time. And of course, let us not forget that battlefields are constantly shifting spaces, and this is not the first shift in the ‘landscape’ of warfare, as the invention of the tank, the aeroplane and the submarine have already gone to show. In this sense then, I’m not really sure how much this paper is adding to our understanding of drones, or drone warfare – nor indeed empire and geopolitics.  

The one thing I did find interesting however, in a non-TTAC21 specific context, was this notion of robots as ‘existential actors’ (455), and autonomy then as an ‘ontological condition’. Again, though I don’t think this is anything new per se, I find it interesting that now we are starting to see a shift in the language around drones, as other disciplines are slowly getting to grips with the impact of drones on our conception of space and the relationship between the human and the machine.  

Mike Ryder, Lancaster University 


I thought this article was interesting, and I liked to reconceptualization of various aspects of targeted killing, modern war, and robotic conflict into abstract geopolitical ideas. However, The part I found most interesting was Shaw’s use of Deleuze’s notion of the dividual, where life is signified by digital information, rather than something truly human. As Shaw himself notes, in signature strikes by remote-controlled drones, the targets are dividuals who simply fit a criteria of a terrorist pattern of life, for example. With future autonomous weapons, killing by criteria is likely to be the same, but a lethal decision-making algorithm is likely to determine all targets based on criteria, whether something simple like an individuals membership of an enemy armed forces, or working out if patterns of life qualify an individual as a terrorist. In this sense, no only do the targets become dividuals, as they are reduced to data points picked up by sensors, but also those deploying autonomous weapons become dividuals as their targeting criteria and therefore their political and military desires become algorithmic data also. It seems that one of the effects of using robotics is not only the de-humanising of potential targets, but also the de-humanising of potential users. 

Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University 


 

What do you think?