The second of our super-solders posts considers the demands modern war places upon today’s soldiers, rather than really thinking of human-enhancement. The regular deployments and increased bureaucracy make it a great change for a few decades ago where many soldiers never saw any real action, nor had to deal with a myriad of other governmental agencies whilst deployed. Basic soldering appears to be getting harder, as soldiers themselves may be getting weaker – we see applications and pass rates for special forces selection dropping in recent years. As our understanding of the impact of operations expand, are we asking too much of the young men and women we ask to fight for us? And can we guess at how this will play out in the future?
Here’s what we thought:
One of the most telling shifts in recent years in my mind has been the ever increasing surveillance surrounding military operations. ‘Kill cams’ and the like have of course been around for some time in the armoured sections of the military, but more specifically here I refer to the way surveillance is now also being used for the men and women on the ground. For me, this opens up a whole raft of problems in terms of accountability and responsibility in warfare, and strikes me also as a major shift towards the ‘robotisation’ of the armed forces. If a soldier can no longer act free from reprisal (or retrospective reprisal) for even the smallest of actions, then why send a human at all, when a machine will be far more effective?
But robots themselves come with their own problems and associated risks. As the 20th century has taught us, it is not good enough to merely shoot or bomb an ‘enemy’ into submission: we must consider the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populace. And quite simply a robot is not in a position to fulfil this role. I wonder then if, long term, the human takes on more of a humanitarian role, while the fighting is left to the machines.
Mike Ryder, Lancaster University
It would seem that the most prevalent trend in modern warfare is operational tempo constantly increasing. We have seen the near-constant deployment of Western special forces since 9/11. The fact that the US have just re-committed to Afghanistan means that there is no chance of the ‘perpetual war on terror’ abating. Thus, it would seem that modern warfare is going to require fighters to fight on a continual basis, with much faster turn-around times between operations than previously. The days of Western nations waiting for the Eastern Bloc to come crashing through Germany are long gone. Indeed, with a terrorist enemy that is capable of attacking anytime, anywhere, it would seem that Western militaries must also be prepared to fight anytime and anywhere.
The strain on the family life of such fighters must be immense. Indeed, we can see in autobiographies of former SAS men that many marriages and family relationships simply fall apart when the soldier in the family is deployed to the other side of the world with only a few hours notice. So, it would seem that the military will require fighters to be totally committed to the causes they are fighting for, rather than their families or themselves. This is, of course totally the opposite of the trend towards providing worked with a greater work-life balance in order to actually be more productive.
Requirements of future conflicts are likely to ask more of soldiers during operations. We already know that counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in urban environments are some of the most cognitively difficult roles soldiers can be asked to do. Yet, with the likely rise of city states in the near future, they could be asked to operate in such environments regularly. Distinguishing who is friend or foe in todays conflicts is difficult, and we regularly see urban police mistake innocent people for armed criminals (particularly in the US), imagine the difficulty when both these issues are essentially combined in military operations in a failed city-state. Difficulty could be further added due to the reducing size of Western militaries. What if NATO countries transform their militaries into small but highly capable forces, in effect large quasi-special force? Small teams in failed city-states will likely have to fend for themselves if there is not a large enough force able to save them. Stories like Black Hawk Down may become far more regular for Western publics to tolerate.
Joshua Hughes, Lancaster University.
What do you think?